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Research shows that people are less likely to have mental health problems after a disaster, if they feel that they have learned
from it and grown as a person. This phenomenon that a traumatic experience can have positive consequences is called “post-
traumatic growth.” In the current study, we investigate whether inhabitants of countries can also experience post-traumatic
growth after a large-scale traumatic experience, namely a terror attack. We examined data from the European Social Survey
with 75,805 participants for thirteen European countries at one moment before a terror attack and two after it. If inhabitants of
these countries experienced post-traumatic growth in terms of  government, then we would expect their political and institu-
tional trust to increase after a terror attack. In terms of post-traumatic growth of community, we expected social trust to in-
crease. Our results suggest that, overall, post-traumatic growth does not occur. Specifically, political trust does not change sig-
nificantly after a terror attack; institutional trust decreases directly after, only to increase again later. In terms of community, so-
cial trust remains largely unaffected after a terror attack. Interestingly, this overall pattern does not occur in all individual coun-
tries: in-depth analyses indicate a pattern in line with post-traumatic growth for specific countries. We discuss potential expla -
nations.
Keywords: terrorism, post-traumatic growth, trust
McMillen, Smith, and Fisher (1997) interviewed people who
witnessed a tornado, mass murder, or airplane crash, directly
after the disaster and also three years later. Those who re-
ported directly after the disaster that they had learned from
their experiences and grown as a person were less likely to
have mental health problems than those who did not. Cal-
houn and Tedeschi (2006) dubbed this phenomenon “post-
traumatic growth”: the phenomenon that a traumatic experi-
ence can have positive consequences (Taku 2011). In the
current study, we investigate whether citizens can also experi-
ence  post-traumatic  growth  after  a  specific  kind  of  large-
scale traumatic experience, namely a terror attack.
We focus on terror attacks, because they can have severe
consequences for the inhabitants of a country, and also be-
cause they have become increasingly common recently (GPI
Expert Panel 2018). Terror attacks have been defined as “an
act of violence […] usually committed against non-combat-
ants, and aimed to achieve behavioral change and political
objectives by creating fear in a larger population” (Doosje et
al. 2016, 79). Terror attacks often aim to undermine feelings
of security, such as trust in the government and trust among
citizens. Yet it remains unclear whether they actually succeed
in doing so. On the contrary, we hypothesize that inhabitants
of countries can also experience post-traumatic growth after
a terror attack. Below, we will first explain how terror attacks
can cause post-traumatic growth at the individual level. Sub-
sequently, we will aim to explain the main contribution of our
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study: how terror attacks can also lead to positive changes
on a societal level.
At the individual level, post-traumatic growth is traditionally
measured in terms of mental health. Although previous re-
search suggests that terror attacks can have a negative im-
pact on mental health, such as increased anxiety (Rubin et
al. 2005; Schuster et al. 2001), these negative effects often
disappear after a number of months. As several authors point
out, positive emotions may buffer individuals against nega-
tive consequences in the aftermath of crises. Or, put in terms
of the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions, posi-
tive  emotions  may  be  the  “active  ingredients” of  trait  re-
silience  (Frederickson  2001).  Powell,  Gilson,  and  Collin
(2012) show how thirteen years after severe traumatic brain
injury, survivors indicated that post-traumatic growth was rel-
atively unchanged compared to the early years after their in-
jury. In the context of terror attacks, Hobfoll et al. (2007) re-
port that when individuals sought to translate growth cogni-
tions to growth actions after the Al Aqsa Intifada, they experi-
enced less psychological distress. Fredrickson et al. (2003)
show how positive emotions in the aftermath of September
11  attacks  fuel  thriving  and  growth  in  psychological  re-
sources. All in all, this suggests that post-traumatic growth
can follow terror attacks, at least at the individual level. 
In line with the broaden-and-build theory of positive emo-
tions, we have seen that “positive emotions […] all share the
ability to broaden people’s momentary thought-action reper-
toires and build their  enduring personal resources, ranging
from physical and intellectual resources to social and psy-
chological  resources” (Frederickson  2001, 219). We  have
furthermore  presented  research  that  shows  that  positive
emotions can not only potentially  dampen distress after  a
terror attack, but may even lead to post-traumatic growth. Al-
though previous research addressed this matter at the indi-
vidual level, we argue that post-traumatic growth after a ter-
ror attack can also have a profound influence at the societal
level. For instance, within two years after the 2011 terror at-
tacks in Norway, 39 percent of Norwegians were quite sure
that the government could prevent future terror attacks. At
the same time, Norwegians reported being more supportive
of the government than before (Wollebœk et al. 2012). 
The aftermath of the 2011 terror attacks in Norway clearly
suggests that terror attacks can be related to changes on a
societal  level. In the current study, we operationalize post-
traumatic growth in terms of increased trust in the govern-
ment and among citizens. We are not the first to relate post-
traumatic growth to trust (see Trzebi ski and Zi ba 2011),ń ę
but we are the first to do so at the societal level. Specifically,
we examine two indicators of the extent to which inhabitants
trust  their  government,  namely  political  and  institutional
trust, and one indicator of the extent to which inhabitants
trust each other in their community, namely social trust.
In terms of government, we first investigate the relationship
between terror attacks and  political trust. Political trust re-
lates  to  political  parties  and  leaders  (Newton  and  Zmerli
2011). For instance, Hetherington and Husser (2011) show
how media coverage of terrorism in the United States influ-
ences people’s political trust in foreign and national defense
policies, because these issues became more salient. Simi-
larly, Gross, Aday, and Brewer  (2004) show that  television
news use was associated with higher levels of trust in gov-
ernment during the military surge that followed the Septem-
ber  11 terrorist  attacks. This  exemplifies how, in some in-
stances, terror attacks can increase political  trust. Another
example is that after the 9/11 terror attacks in the United
States, popular approval of the President rose (Moore 2001).
This may be due to the fact that people often value a strong
and charismatic  leader  during a  crisis  (Bligh, Kohles, and
Meindl 2004). Clearly, political trust can be affected by terror
attacks.
Also in terms of government, we examine institutional trust.
Institutional trust relates to people’s trust of institutions such
as the government and police (Hudson 2006). Simply put,
when political parties and leaders become more popular af-
ter a terror attack, it is likely that trust in the government’s in-
stitutions will also increase. For instance, when political lead-
ers express their trust in these institutions, people are more
likely to do so too. A good example is provided by the after-
math of the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States, where
people expressed increased support for US institutions, such
as the army (Klarevas, Gelpi and Reifler 2006). Similarly, for
at least ten months after the 2011 terror attacks in Norway,
Norwegians reported increased trust in the police and justice
system (Wollebœk et al. 2012). 
Political and institutional trust encompass the relationship
between inhabitants of a country and the various aspects of
the state. In addition, we argue that terror attacks can affect
the relationships between inhabitants themselves, namely in
IJCV: Vol. 12/2018
Doosje, van der Veen, Klaver: Can Societies Experience Post-Traumatic Growth after a Terror Attack? The Influence of Terror 
Attacks on Political, Institutional, and Social Trust in European Countries
3
terms of social trust. Put differently, social trust is the belief
that other people are reliable and trustworthy (Borum 2010).
Anecdotal evidence for the hypothesis that social trust might
increase after  a terror attack comes from political  leaders
emphasizing unity after a terror attack. For example, after the
beheading of an American-Israeli journalist by ISIS in 2014,
President  Obama stated:  “Americans are  repulsed by their
barbarism, we will not be intimidated, their horrific acts only
unite  us” (“Sotloff  beheading:  Obama  warning  to  Islamic
State,”  BBC.com, September  3, 2014). More  rigorous  evi-
dence is provided by studies that show increased social trust
after terror attacks. For instance, Gross et al. (2004) show
that people who read newspapers after the September 11
terrorist  attacks  generally  reported  increased  social  trust.
Similarly, Wollebœk et al. (2012) report how after the 2011
terror attacks in Norway this type of trust increased. Finally,
Joseph and Linley (2008) analyze the results of various stud-
ies and conclude that, “taken conjointly, […] terrorist attacks
can have an unexpected rebound effect on […] intragroup
cohesion, which is probably the opposite from the effect in-
tended by the terrorists” (77).
In sum, we formulate two hypotheses about the relation-
ship  between terror  attacks  and post-traumatic growth. As
mentioned before, McMillen et al. (1997) report post-trau-
matic growth already directly after  a traumatic incident. As
such, Hypothesis 1 predicts that post-traumatic growth is vis-
ible directly after a terror attack, manifesting as an increase
in political, institutional, and social trust compared to before
the attack. In addition, traumatic experiences are not easily
forgotten (Hobfoll et  al. 2007; Powell et  al. 2012). For in-
stance,  even  seven  months  after  the  July  2005  London
bombings, Londoners reported substantial stress, perceived
threat, and reduced travelling (Rubin et al. 2007). In a simi-
lar vein, we expect post-traumatic growth to be relatively sta-
ble. Hypothesis 2 therefore predicts that the increase in po-
litical, institutional, and social trust after a terror attack re-
mains stable at least one year after the terror attack.
1. Method
1.1 Design
We used a quantitative longitudinal design based on data
from  the  Global  Terrorism  Database  (GTD;  www.start.  - 
umd.edu/gtd) and European Social Survey (ESS; www.euro-
pean  socialsurvey.org  ). The dependent measure is  posttrau-
matic  growth, namely  the  degree  of  political, institutional,
and social trust. The independent measure is the measure-
ment moment, once before and twice after the terror attack.
1.2. Participants
From the GTD, we selected countries that had witnessed at
least one terror attack between 2002 and 2014, but also
had periods devoid of any terror attacks. In other words, we
excluded European countries that  witnessed a great  many
terror attacks or did not have periods free of terror attacks.
We also excluded countries for which data were not available
for all variables. As a result, we included the following thir-
teen countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the  Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In total, we
included  75,805  participants  from  the  ESS. Participants’
ages ranged from 14 to 102 (M = 46.3,  SD = 18.7) and
51.3 percent identified as female.
1.3. Materials
The ESS is a cross-national survey that measures public atti-
tudes and opinions in Europe. Every two years, the ESS aims
to interview at least 1,500 randomly chosen inhabitants per
country (800 for smaller countries). Participants are asked to
state their answers to items printed on cards. We included
the following three variables in our study: political, institu-
tional, and social trust.
The ESS measured political  trust with three items: “How
much do you personally trust [the parliament] [politicians]
[political parties]?” Institutional trust consisted of two items:
“How much do you personally trust the [legal system] [po-
lice]?” For political and institutional trust, participants indi-
cated  their  answers  from 0  (“Do  not  trust  at  all”)  to  10
(“Complete  trust”). Social  trust  was  measured  with  three
items. First, “Most people can be trusted, or you can’t be too
careful  in dealing with people” from 0 (“You can’t  be too
careful”)  to  10  (“Most  people  can  be  trusted”). Second,
“Most people would try to take advantage of you if they got
the chance, or would try to be fair” from 0 (“Most people try
to take advantage of you”) to 10 (“Most people try to be
fair”). Third, “Most of the time people try to be helpful, or
they are mostly looking out for themselves” from 0 (“People
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mostly look out for themselves”) to 10 (“People mostly try to
be helpful”). For all items, higher scores indicate higher lev-
els of trust.
1.4. Procedure
From the GTD, we selected those countries that not only wit-
nessed one or more terror attacks, but also had periods de-
void of any terror attacks. We only examined terror attacks
that meet all GTD requirements and were executed success-
fully. We included six  measurement  moments of  the Euro-
pean Social Survey, namely every two years in 2002–2012
(ESS1=2002;  ESS2=2004;  ESS3=2006;  ESS4=2008;
ESS5=2010; ESS6=2012). For each country, we determined
when the terror attack took place and which three ESS mea-
surement moments could be used as pre-measurement and
post-measurements 1 and 2. Concerning the measurement
moments, we selected the pre-measurement that had been
administered no more than two years before the terror at-
tack;  we selected the post-measurement 1 that had been
administered as soon as possible after the terror attack, and
no more than a year after; and we selected the post-mea-
surement 2 that had been administered at least one year af-
ter post-measurement 1. Table 1 provides information about
the terror  attacks and ESS measurement  moments  in  the
aforementioned thirteen countries.
Although we aimed to include only countries that had ex-
perienced relatively long periods without terror attacks be-
tween 2002 and 2012, these were difficult to find. In fact, a
number of countries witnessed terror attacks around one of
the ESS measurement moments, namely the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom.1 For two reasons, we still included these countries
1 There are a number of additional exceptions to these rules. First, 
the third wave of the ESS did not include the Czech Republic. As 
such, only for this country, there are four years between the pre-
measurement and the post-measurement 1. Second, a series of 
terror attacks took place during one of the measurement moments 
in Hungary. Terrorists were responsible for the so-called Roma mur-
ders, which kept Hungarians in suspense for 167 consecutive days. 
The terrorists were caught in August 2009 (Vágvölgyi, 2014), which 
we therefore designated as the end of this terror attack. Third, the 
period between the terror attack and post-measurement 1 is fifteen 
months in Belgium and thirteen months in Hungary. Fourth, al-
though Spain witnessed many relatively minor terror attacks, it was 
still included to investigate the consequences of the large-scale 
2004 Madrid train bombings. Similarly, Ireland has witnessed many
attacks. However, there are significant differences between the scale
in the analyses. First, our study benefits from a representa-
tive sample size. Second, we ensured that the scale of the
selected terror attacks is significantly more severe than other
terror attack(s). In some cases, the terror attack took place
during post-measurement  1.  Participants  who  were  inter-
viewed before the terror attack were then included in the pre-
measurement instead of post-measurement 1.
In line with the ESS recommendations (European Social Sur-
vey  2014),  we  weighted  the  variables.  Post-stratification
weights were applied to correct for non-response bias and
sampling error, which can result from differences in age, gen-
der,  education,  and  region.  Population-size  weights  were
used when combining data from multiple countries. Without
this correction, countries with a lower population size would
be overrepresented compared to countries with a larger pop-
ulation size. When analyzing data within a single country, we
only applied the post-stratification weights. In contrast, when
we compared data between multiple countries, we multiplied
the  post-stratification  with  the  population-size  weights. All
analyses use weights.
2. Results
Collapsed  across  countries,  Cronbach’s  alpha  reliabilities
ranged  from  good  to  sufficient,  namely  .90  for  political
trust,  .76  for  institutional  trust,  and  .72  for  social  trust.
Within countries, Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for the thir-
teen countries ranged from .75 to .87 for political trust, .66
to .82 for institutional trust, and .66 to .78 for social trust.
We then analyzed whether there are differences in political,
institutional, and social trust between the pre-measurement
and post-measurements 1 and 2, collapsed across all coun-
tries. Because all Levene’s tests indicated that the variances
of groups were not homogenous, we carried out Welch’s one-
way  ANOVAs  and  Games-Howell  post-hoc  tests. Collapsed
across countries, Table 2 depicts the differences in political,
institutional, and social trust between the ESS measurement
moments, namely Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs,
and Games-Howell post-hoc tests. We describe these find-
ings below.
In terms of government, the mean of  political trust does
not differ  significantly between the pre-measurement (M  =
of these attacks. We decided to examine a period in which a rela-
tively severe attack took place, in the hope that this attack would 
stand out.
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4.13, SD = 2.18) and post-measurement 1 (M = 4.12, SD =
2.13). Similarly, political trust does not differ significantly be-
tween post-measurement 1 and 2 (M = 4.14, SD = 2.19).
That  is, collapsed across all  countries, the results suggest
that political trust does not significantly differ after the terror
attack compared to before, neither directly after nor at least
one year later.
Also in terms of government, the mean of institutional trust
decreases  significantly  from  the  pre-measurement  (M  =
5.82, SD = 2.20) to post-measurement 1 (M = 5.62, SD =
2.15), only  to  increase  significantly  again  from post-mea-
surement 1 to 2 (M = 5.94, SD = 2.14). In other words, col-
lapsed across all countries, institutional trust falls directly af-
ter the terror attack, but rises again at least one year later,
although the effect size is rather low (η2 = .003). 
In terms of community, social trust does not differ signifi-
cantly between the pre-measurement (M = 5.34, SD = 1.78)
and post-measurement 1 (M = 5.31, SD = 1.78). Similarly,
social trust does not differ significantly from post-measure-
ment 1 to 2 (M = 5.34, SD = 1.74). That is, collapsed across
all countries, social trust remains largely unaffected after a
terror attack.
The previous analyses concerned the mean of political, in-
stitutional, and social trust, when collapsed across all coun-
tries. In the following, we again analyze  the differences in
trust  between the measurement  moments, but  now within
countries. Similar to before, we first analyze two indicators of
the  extent  to  which  inhabitants  trust  their  government,
namely political and institutional trust, and then one indica-
tor  of  the  extent  to  which  inhabitants  trust  each  other,
namely social trust. 
First, we tested whether  political trust differs between the
measurement moments within countries. A factorial  ANOVA
indicates a significant interaction between measurement mo-
ment  and country (F(24, 74967) = 36.09,  p < .001). As
such, we subsequently  analyzed every  country  individually.
Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of political
trust, as well as the number of participants, by country, for
every measurement moment. Table 4 shows the differences
in political trust between the measurement moments, using
Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs, and Games-Howell
post-hoc tests. 
The most common pattern is stable political trust between
the pre-measurement and post-measurement 1, followed by
an increase in political trust between post-measurement 1
and 2. Specifically, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom conform to this pattern. Also common is
a completely stable pattern of political trust, namely in the
Czech  Republic, Denmark, and  Switzerland. Germany  and
Sweden show an increase in political trust between pre-mea-
surement and post-measurement 1, only for political trust to
then drop between post-measurement 1 and 2. The remain-
ing patterns are stable political trust followed by a decrease
(Finland), a  decrease  in  political  trust  followed by  an  in-
crease (Hungary), a steady increase in political trust through
all measurement moments (Norway), and an increase in po-
litical  trust  between  the  pre-measurement  and  post-mea-
surement 1, which then remains stable between post-mea-
surement 1 and 2 (Spain). 
Second, we tested  whether  institutional trust  differs  be-
tween the measurement moments within countries. Tested in
a factorial ANOVA, the interaction between measurement mo-
ment  and country  was  again  significant  (F(24, 75315)  =
15.82,  p < .001). This allows us to analyze and examine ev-
ery country individually. Table 5 shows the mean and stan-
dard deviation of institutional trust, as well as the number of
participants, by country, for every measurement moment. Ta-
ble  6  shows  differences  in  institutional  trust  between  the
measurement moments, namely Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-
way ANOVAs and Games-Howell post-hoc tests. 
The most common pattern is  an increase in institutional
trust  between pre-measurement  and post-measurement  1,
which  then  remains  stable  between  post-measurement  1
and 2. Specifically, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Nor-
way, and Sweden conform to this pattern. Also common is a
completely  stable  pattern,  namely  in  Finland,  Ireland,
Switzerland, and  the  Netherlands. Denmark  and  Hungary
show a decrease in institutional trust between the pre-mea-
surement and post-measurement 1, followed by an increase
between post-measurement 1 and 2. The remaining patterns
are a steady increase in institutional trust through all mea-
surement moments (Spain) and stable institutional trust fol-
lowed by an increase (United Kingdom).
Third, we tested whether  social trust differs between the
measurement moments within countries. A factorial ANOVA
indicates a significant interaction between measurement mo-
ment  and country  (F(24, 75694) = 7.37,  p < .001). As
such, we subsequently  analyzed every  country  individually.
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Table 7 depicts the mean and standard deviation of political
trust, as well as the number of participants, by country, for
every measurement moment. Table 8 depicts differences in
political trust between the measurement moments, namely
Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs and Games-Howell
post-hoc tests. 
The most common pattern is completely stable social trust
through  all  measurement  moments. Specifically, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden con-
form to this pattern. Hungary and Ireland show an initial de-
crease in social trust between pre-measurement and post-
measurement 1, only to increase again between post-mea-
surement 1 and 2. Another pattern, namely in Switzerland
and the United Kingdom, is stable social trust between pre-
measurement and post-measurement 1, followed by a de-
crease between post-measurement 1 and 2. The remaining
patterns are stable social trust followed by an increase (Bel-
gium), increase  in  social  trust  which  then  remains  stable
(Czech Republic), and decrease in social trust which then re-
mains stable (Spain).
3. Discussion
Research shows that people are less likely to have mental
health problems after a disaster, if they feel that they have
learned from it  and grown as a person. The feeling that a
traumatic  experience  can  have  positive  consequences  is
called “post-traumatic growth.” In the current study, we inves-
tigate whether societies can also experience post-traumatic
growth after a large-scale traumatic experience, namely a ter-
ror attack. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that post-traumatic growth would
be visible directly after a terror attack, in the form of an in-
crease in political, institutional, and social trust compared to
before the attack. When collapsed across countries, political
and social trust did not differ between before the terror at-
tack and directly after it. That is, the overall pattern for politi-
cal and social trust did not confirm Hypothesis 1. Interest-
ingly,  when  collapsed  across  countries,  institutional  trust
shows a decrease directly after  a terror  attack. Again, this
findings contrasts with our expectations.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the supposed increase in po-
litical, institutional, and social trust after a terror attack re-
mains stable to at least one year after the terror attack. Polit-
ical  and social  trust  did  indeed remain  stable  from post-
measurement 1 to 2, but did not show an increase in the
first place. Hence, the overall pattern for political and social
trust failed to confirm Hypothesis 2. Again, when collapsed
across  countries, institutional  trust  does  change:  between
post-measurement 1 and 2, institutional trust increases to
approximately its value before the terror attack. However in-
teresting this finding, it does not confirm Hypothesis 2.
In terms of government, we find that political trust does not
significantly differ after the terror attack compared to before.
This is true for the trust directly after the attack and for levels
of trust at least one year later. In terms of community, social
trust shows a similar pattern. At least when collapsed across
all countries, this suggests that terror attacks have little influ-
ence on these types of trust in our sample. Yet also in terms
of government, institutional trust decreases after a terror at-
tack. However, this institutional trust rises again at least one
year later. In other words, a terror attack seems to have a
negative effect on institutional trust, but this seems to be
merely  temporary. As  to  our  point  of  departure, post-trau-
matic growth, we can only conclude that we do not find any
evidence for post-traumatic growth in countries after a terror
attack, when collapsed across all countries.
However, we  did  not  only  analyze  post-traumatic  growth
collapsed across countries, but also the patterns within indi-
vidual countries (see Table 3–8). These analyses, warranted
by significant interactions, show some patterns that do pro-
vide support for the hypotheses. Again, Hypotheses 1 and 2
predicted that post-traumatic growth would be visible directly
after a terror attack, namely in terms of a higher level of po-
litical, institutional, and social trust compared to before the
attack, and then remain stable to at least one year after the
terror attack. In terms of political trust, the pattern in Spain
is fully in line with our hypotheses: an increase in political
trust  directly  after  the  terror  attack, which  remains  stable
over time. With regard to institutional trust, several countries
confirm our expectations: Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
Norway, and Sweden show an initial increase in institutional
trust, which remains stable over time. Finally, concerning so-
cial trust, one country shows a pattern in which social trust
increases  after  the  terror  attack  and  remains  stable  over
time, namely the Czech Republic.
As such, there are a number of countries that confirm the
predictions of both Hypothesis 1 and 2. Of course, if we only
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look at one of the hypotheses, even more countries qualify.
For instance, if we examine only the countries in which politi-
cal, institutional, or social trust increased after a terror at-
tack, either directly after or at least one year later, then we
see that many countries support our predictions of post-trau-
matic growth, including Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
Why some countries follow a post-traumatic growth pattern
and other countries do not, is not an easy question to an-
swer. One can think of factors related to the population size,
but this does not appear to be a good candidate if we exam-
ine the different countries, because there is no clear pattern
when  relating  population  size  to  the  pattern  of  post-trau-
matic growth. Similarly, cultural norms and values seem not
good candidates either, because the countries that show a
post-traumatic  growth  pattern  differ  from  each  other  on
these dimensions. Alternatively, it is possible to examine the
nature of the attacks, for  example, how large or impactful
was the attack (number of casualties or damage). One might
speculate that with a large attack, the post-growth pattern
might be more pronounced, but these are fruitful questions
to examine in future studies. 
Another interesting route is to examine the role of emo-
tions and, in particular, mimicry of emotions. Based on Van
der Schalk et al. (2011), we argue that convergent emotional
reactions of in-group members to a terrorist attack, for exam-
ple in terms of fear, can potentially via mimicry, result in in-
creased liking for in-group members (and not for outgroup
members). In their research, Van der Schalk et al. show that
people increase their liking for in-group members to the ex-
tent that they mimic the emotional displays of their  fellow
group members. This increased liking may be translated into
more in-group trust as well.   
In conclusion, despite the fact that there is little overall evi-
dence that post-traumatic growth occurs in countries after a
terror attack, some countries do provide support for the post-
traumatic  hypotheses. For  some countries, on some mea-
sures, we did observe a pattern in line with post-traumatic
growth, such as in Spain, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
Norway, and Sweden. It is important to note, however, that
the countries that exhibit a pattern in line with our expecta-
tions for  post-traumatic growth are in the minority. For  in-
stance, for institutional trust, only five out of thirteen coun-
tries show a pattern in line with our hypotheses, and even
fewer countries do so for political and social trust. As such,
our study finds only very limited support  for  the idea that
post-traumatic growth occurs in countries after a terror at-
tack.
3.1 Limitations
First, as the current  study is  correlational, we need to be
careful with causal conclusions. In other words, changes in
political or institutional trust may have been caused by other
factors than the terror attack. Although it is impossible to ex-
clude all such external influences, we attempted to minimize
their effect by including as many European countries as pos-
sible. While there are many unique things that may have hap-
pened in these countries, they have one common factor: the
occurrence of a terror attack. After new editions of the ESS
appear, future studies could carry out additional analyses.
More specifically, future studies could include a more spe-
cific estimate of the time between the terror attack that oc-
curred and registration of political, institutional, and social
trust in the ESS, allowing for a more detailed study of poten-
tial pattern of post-traumatic growth. 
Second, the current study is based on three measurement
moments. It can therefore be hard to determine the duration
of an increase or decrease in trust. If a future study were to
take all ESS measurement moments and terror attacks into
account, then it could be easier to determine the duration of
possible post-traumatic growth and other patterns.
Third, p-values are naturally low due to the large number of
participants, namely  75,805. In  the case  of  such a  large
sample, it  is  important  to  examine the proportions of  ex-
plained variance. Given that the effect sizes are rather low in
the analyses, some caution is warranted with regard to our
conclusions.
Another limitation is that in eight of the countries other ter-
ror attacks took place just before or after an ESS measure-
ment moment, potentially confounding the results: Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, and the United  Kingdom. For  instance, a  constant
threat of actions by ETA in Spain may influence political, in-
stitutional, and social trust aside from the 2004 Madrid train
bombings. To minimize the influence of other terror attacks,
we have included three ESS measurement moments. Future
studies could try, if possible, to include only countries that
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witnessed  a  single  terror  attack  in  a  certain  time period.
Such a study should also consider including countries out-
side Europe. For instance, data from the World Value Survey
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp)  or  General  So-
cial Survey (http://gss.norc.org/) could be used.
A final point of criticism is that one might wonder whether
we have covered all aspects of growth for individuals within a
society after a terror attack. While this seems almost impos-
sible in a single study, we chose to investigate political, insti-
tutional,  and  social  trust  as  indicators  of  post-traumatic
growth, because these are often the very variables that ter-
rorism tries  to undermine. Investigating an opposite  effect
then seemed to us indicative of true growth after a traumatic
experience. Practically, we chose these three types of trust
because they are uniquely covered in the ESS. That is, these
variables are backed up by a wealth of data, covering hun-
dreds of thousands of participants (in representative sam-
ples) throughout various countries and years. In sum, while
our measures may not capture post-traumatic growth com-
pletely, we believe that they are the best starting points to in-
vestigate post-traumatic growth.
3.2 Implications
The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions predicts
that traumatic events can cause people to “build their endur-
ing personal resources, ranging from physical and intellectual
resources to social and psychological resources” (Frederick-
son 2001, 219). Several  studies show that post-traumatic
growth can follow after terror attacks, at least at the individ-
ual level (Hobfoll et al. 2007; Fredrickson et al. 2003). At the
societal  level,  too,  there  is  evidence  that  post-traumatic
growth can also influence people (Wollebœk et al. 2012).
However, the results of the current study only provide very
limited support for the idea that post-traumatic growth can
occur in terms of political, institutional, or social trust after a
terror attack. In a theoretical sense, then, the current article
contributes to the literature by casting a critical shadow over
the idea that post-traumatic growth can foster trust, at least
in our contemporary European sample.
Certain countries did confirm our expectations in terms of
post-traumatic growth, but at this moment, it is difficult  to
establish why the pattern was observed in some countries
and not in others. Here we think a more nuanced and per-
haps qualitative study might shed more light on the different
reactions to terror attacks in the different countries in our
sample. For example, one important component might be the
official reactions by political leaders after an attack. Do they
have a firm and clear answer in response to the attack? And
are these political leaders able to deliver a message that res-
onates well with the shared emotional climate and that stim-
ulates a sense of unity in citizens who are often bewildered,
scared, or even angered after an attack?
In a practical sense, our study once again emphasizes the
importance of trust in the government, in terms of political
and institutional trust, and trust among citizens, as consti-
tuted by social trust, in the aftermath of a terror attack. In-
deed, terrorism often aims to undermine these kinds of trust
(Fierke, 2009). As Longstaff and Yang (2008) point out, in
times of such public danger, trust is one of the most impor-
tant variables for successfully overcoming such danger. They
show how preparedness, internal coordination, and effective
leadership all depend on trust. Our results show that for cer-
tain countries, political, institutional, or social trust dropped
after a terror attack. As such, governments would do well to
take counter-measures if they sees a decrease in any kind of
trust, especially  given that  distrust  in  the government  has
been  identified  as  a  driver  for  terrorism  itself  (Wheeler
2009).
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, we investigated whether inhabitants of coun-
tries can experience post-traumatic growth after a terror at-
tack. First, we hypothesized that post-traumatic growth would
be visible directly after a terror attack, namely an increase in
political, institutional, and social  trust  compared to before
the attack. Second, we predicted that the increase in politi-
cal, institutional, and social trust after a terror attack would
remain stable at least one year after  the terror attack. Al-
though certain individual countries show such patterns, our
overall results do not suggest that countries typically experi-
ence post-traumatic growth after a terror attack. That is, when
collapsed across countries, political, institutional, and social
trust remain largely unaffected by a terror attack on the long
term. Although the overall pattern does not confirm our ex-
pectations of post-traumatic growth after a terror attack, it is
important to note that our analyses do not show loss of po-
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litical, institutional, and social trust either. As such, our re-
sults cast doubt upon the effectiveness of terror attacks in
eroding political, institutional, and social trust.
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Table 1: Per country, information about the ESS waves and measurement moments; and for the corresponding terror
attack(s), the location, date, and casualties and injured






Belgium 1 (01-10-2002 – 30-04-2003)
2 (04-10-2004 – 31-01-2005)
3 (23-10-2006 – 19-02-2007)
Brussels 04-06-2003 0 (20)
Czech Republic 2 (01-10-2004 – 13-12-2004)
4 (08-06-2009 – 08-07-2009)
5 (20-01-2011 – 08-03-2011)
Brno 28-06-2008 0 (20)
Denmark 3 (19-09-2006 – 02-05-2007)
4 (01-09-2008 – 11-01-2009)
5 (20-09-2010 – 31-01-2011)
Odense 31-12-2008 0 (2)
Finland 3 (18-09-2006 – 20-12-2006)
4 (19-09-2008 – 05-02-2009)
5 (13-09-2010 – 30-12-2010)
Helsinki 21-10-2008 0 (1)
Germany 3 (01-09-2006 – 15-01-2007)
4 (27-08-2008 – 31-01-2009)
5 (15-09-2010 – 03-02-2012)
Passau 13-12-2008 0 (1)
Hungary 3 (21-11-2006 – 28-01-2007)
5 (19-10-2010 – 10-12-2010)
6 (10-11-2012 – 17-02-2013)
Piricse 08-08-2008 0 (1)
Nagycsécs 03-11-2008 2 (1)
Alsózsolca 15-12-2008 2 (1)
Tatárszentgyörgy 24-02-2009 2 (1)
Tiszalök 22-03-2009 1 (0)
Kisléta 03-09-2009 1 (1)
Ireland 2 (18-01-2005 – 20-06-2005)
3 (14-09-2006 – 31-08-2007)
4 (11-09-2008 – 12-03-2009)
Belfast 06-03-2007 0 (51)
Norway 4 (25-08-2008 – 20-01-2009)
5 (09-09-2010 – 15-02-2011)
6 (14-08-2012 – 08-02-2013)
Oslo 25-01-2010 0 (1)
Spain 1 (19-11-2002 – 20-02-2003)
2 (27-09-2004 – 31-01-2005)
3 (25-10-2006 – 04-03-2007)
Madrid 11-03-2004 37 (450)
Madrid 11-03-2004 73 (450)
Madrid 11-03-2004 19 (450)
Madrid 11-03-2004 62 (450)
Sweden 4 (15-09-2008 – 03-02-2009)
5 (27-09-2010 – 01-03-2011)
6 (01-09-2012 – 28-01-2013)
Stockholm 11-12-2010 1 (2)
Switzerland 3 (24-08-2006 – 02-04-2007)
4 (27-09-2010 – 01-03-2011)
5 (02-10-2010 – 23-03-2011)
Crissier 12-11-2007 0 (1)
The Netherlands 1 (01-09-2002 – 24-02-2003)
2 (11-09-2004 – 19-02-2005)
3 (16-09-2006 – 18-02-2007)
Amsterdam 02-11-2004 2 (1)
United Kingdom 2 (27-09-2004 – 16-03-2005)
3 (05-09-2006 – 14-01-2007)
4 (01-09-2008 – 19-01-2009)
London 07-07-2008 8 (171)
London 07-07-2008 27 (340)
London 07-07-2008 7 (163)
London 07-07-2008 14 (110)
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Table 2: Collapsed across countries, means (M) and standard deviations (SD), Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs, and 
Games-Howell post-hoc tests for (the differences in) political, institutional, and social trust between the ESS measurement 
moments
Trust type M (SD) Levene’s test One-way ANOVA Pre-Post 1 Pre-Post 2 Post 1-Post 2 
Political Pre: 4.13 (2.18)
Post 1: 4.12 (2.13)
Post 2: 4.14 (2.19)





p = .922 p = .981 p = .855
Institutional Pre: 5.82 (2.20)
Post 1:5.62 (2.15)
Post 2:5.94 (2.14)





p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Social Pre: 5.34 (1.78)
Post 1: 5.31 (1.74)
Post 2: 5.33 (1.77)





p = .142 p = .950 p = .273
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Table 3: Per country, the means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of political trust, as well as the number of par-
ticipants (N), for every measurement moment
Country Measurement moment M SD N
Belgium Pre 4.49 2.12 1859
Post-1 4.42 2.03 1768
Post-2 4.62 1.95 1791
Czech Republic Pre 2.97 2.09 2927
Post-1 3.01 2.08 2000
Post-2 2.95 2.14 2348
Denmark Pre 5.91 1.94 3050
Post-1 5.74 1.75 41
Post-2 5.37 1.97 1553
Finland Pre 5.44 1.99 2300
Post-1 5.46 1.93 1770
Post-2 4.88 2.09 1866
Germany Pre 3.85 2.09 4532
Post-1 4.06 1.97 1061
Post-2 3.81 2.11 2998
Hungary Pre 2.92 2.20 1562
Post-1 2.21 2.01 1502
Post-2 3.66 2.32 1533
Ireland Pre 4.26 2.16 3342
Post-1 4.43 2.13 690
Post-2 3.53 2.14 1758
Norway Pre 5.06 1.96 1541
Post-1 5.47 1.91 1544
Post-2 5.66 1.90 1610
Spain Pre 4.01 2.15 1646
Post-1 4.29 2.04 1621
Post-2 4.22 2.09 1848
Sweden Pre 5.32 1.94 2748
Post-1 5.73 1.78 547
Post-2 5.37 2.02 1829
Switzerland Pre 5.34 1.81 1775
Post-1 5.36 1.78 1774
Post-2 5.39 1.95 1480
The Netherlands Pre 5.00 1.84 2493
Post-1 4.97 1.78 2622
Post-2 5.23 1.69 989
United Kingdom Pre 3.96 2.14 1884
Post-1 3.83 2.09 2936
Post-2 3.97 2.21 2334
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Table 4: Per country, Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs and Games-Howell post-hoc tests for the differences in politi-
cal trust between the ESS measurement moments
Country Levene’s test One-way ANOVA Pre-Post 1 Pre-Post 2 Post 1-Post 2
Belgium F(2, 5421) = 7.50
 p = .001
F(2, 3612.19) = 4.40
p = .012
p = .492 p = .186 p = .009
Czech Republic F(2, 7295) = 2.24
 p = .107
F(2, 4599.39) = .43
p = .653
p = .758 p = .969 p = .649
Denmark F(2, 4648) = .91
p = .404
F(2, 110.87) = 38.88
p < .001
p = .756 p < .001 p = .411
Finland F(2, 5938) = 11.94
p < .001
F(2, 3846.10) = 49.70
p < .001
p = .975 p < .001 p < .001




p = .006 p = .733 p = 002
Hungary F(2, 4607) = 16.60
p < .001
F(2, 3064.18) = 169.30
p < .001
p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Ireland F(2, 5797) = .080
p = .923
F(2, 1846.18) = 78.26
p < .001
p = .132 p < .001 p < .001
Norway F(2, 4696) = .95
p = .388
F(2, 3125.01) = 39.71
p < .001
p < .001 p < .001 p = .020
Spain F(2, 5132) = 3.12
p = .044
F(2, 3394.74) = 8.37
p < .001
p < .001 p = .006 p = .608
Sweden F(2, 5130) = 8.47
p < .001
F(2, 1561.59) = 12.33
p < .001
p < .001 p = .689 p < .001
Switzerland F(2, 5034) = 8.60
p < .001
F(2, 3266.52) = .25
p = .781
p = .962 p = .764 p = .889
The Netherlands F(2, 6103) = 4.06
p = .017
F(2, 2798.71) = 8.98
p < .001
p = .734 p = .001 p < .001
United Kingdom F(2, 7168) = 2.90
p = .055
F(2, 4415.46) = 4.19
p = .015
p = .057 p = .992 p = .030
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Table 5: Per country, the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of institutional trust, as well as the number of par-
ticipants (N), for each measurement moment
Country Measurement moment M SD N
Belgium Pre 4.97 2.15 1859
Post-1 5.29 2.05 1768
Post-2 5.37 2.04 1791
Czech Republic Pre 3.98 2.26 2927
Post-1 4.51 2.24 2000
Post-2 4.52 2.20 2348
Denmark Pre 7.36 1.80 3050
Post-1 6.33 2.52 41
Post-2 7.45 1.74 1553
Finland Pre 7.53 1.63 2300
Post-1 7.55 1.67 1770
Post-2 7.44 1.67 1866
Germany Pre 6.15 2.09 4532
Post-1 6.40 2.00 1061
Post-2 6.28 2.09 2998
Hungary Pre 4.71 2.49 1562
Post-1 3.94 2.36 1502
Post-2 4.87 2.30 1533
Ireland Pre 5.78 2.13 3342
Post-1 5.61 2.22 690
Post-2 5.78 1.99 1758
Norway Pre 6.79 1.89 1541
Post-1 7.01 1.88 1544
Post-2 7.15 1.75 1610
Spain Pre 4.83 2.22 1646
Post-1 5.26 2.06 1621
Post-2 5.55 2.03 1848
Sweden Pre 6.45 1.91 2748
Post-1 6.74 1.85 547
Post-2 6.53 1.93 1829
Switzerland Pre 6.61 1.89 1775
Post-1 6.59 1.84 1774
Post-2 6.67 1.96 1480
The Netherlands Pre 5.70 1.84 2493
Post-1 5.80 1.76 2622
Post-2 5.94 1.68 989
United Kingdom Pre 5.63 2.08 1884
Post-1 5.51 2.10 2936
Post-2 5.75 2.14 2334
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Table 6: Per country, Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs and Games-Howell post-hoc tests for the differences in  institu-
tional trust between the ESS measurement moments
Country Levene’s test One-way ANOVA Pre-Post 1 Pre-Post 2 Post 1-Post 2
Belgium F(2, 5449) = 6.49
p = .002
F(2, 3632.19) = 20.15
p < .001
p < .001 p < .001 p = .482
Czech Republic F(2, 7310) = 1.17
p = .309
F(2, 4623.39) = 50.85
p < .001
p < .001 p < .001 p = .984
Denmark F(2, 4676) = 7.62
p < .001
F(2, 108.98) = 3.80
p = .025
p = .026 p = .892 p = .023
Finland F(2, 5953) = .01
p = .993
F(2, 3843.39) = 2.19
p = .112
p = .939 p = .199 p = .134




p = .001 p = .028 p = .237
Hungary F(2, 4620) = 7.16
p = .001
F(2, 3077.40) = 68.46
p < .001
p < .001 p = .120 p < .001
Ireland F(2, 5830) = 7.67
p < .001
F(2, 1835.59) = 1.98
p = .138
p = .125 p = .995 p = .171
Norway F(2, 4707) = 4.50
p = .011
F(2, 3122.96) = 15.95
p < .001
p = .004 p < .001 p = .053
Spain F(2, 5168) = 6.60
p = .001
F(2, 3402.15) = 49.42
p < .001
p < .001 p < .001 p < .001
Sweden F(2, 5157) = 3.09
p = .046
F(2, 1544.89) = 6.05
p = .002
p = .002 p = .315 p = .050
Switzerland F(2, 5118) = 4.69
p = .009
F(2, 3327.81) = .43
p = .654
p = .976 p = .769 p = .642
The Netherlands F(2, 6117) = 10.63
p < .001
F(2, 2810.81) = 6.86
p = .001
p = .118 p = .001 p = .075
United Kingdom F(2, 7204) = .46
p = .631
F(2, 4460.68) = 8.62
p < .001
p = .111 p = .161 p < .001
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Belgium Pre 4.86 1.85 1859
Post-1 4.89 1.71 1768
Post-2 5.06 1.72 1791
Czech Republic Pre 4.45 1.87 2927
Post-1 4.80 2.03 2000
Post-2 4.68 2.00 2348
Denmark Pre 6.69 1.59 3050
Post-1 6.54 1.82 41
Post-2 6.65 1.48 1553
Finland Pre 6.40 1.49 2300
Post-1 6.31 1.53 1770
Post-2 6.34 1.51 1866
Germany Pre 5.19 1.71 4532
Post-1 5.20 1.77 1061
Post-2 5.19 1.74 2998
Hungary Pre 4.50 2.11 1562
Post-1 4.27 1.90 1502
Post-2 4.65 1.91 1533
Ireland Pre 5.93 1.82 3342
Post-1 5.59 1.82 690
Post-2 5.84 1.58 1758
Norway Pre 6.45 1.50 1541
Post-1 6.55 1.48 1544
Post-2 6.55 1.42 1610
Spain Pre 4.84 1.83 1646
Post-1 4.77 1.79 1621
Post-2 4.99 1.50 1848
Sweden Pre 6.36 1.52 2748
Post-1 6.33 1.54 547
Post-2 6.20 1.59 1829
Switzerland Pre 5.93 1.52 1775
Post-1 5.88 1.64 1774
Post-2 5.88 1.67 1480
The Netherlands Pre 5.70 1.84 2493
Post-1 5.80 1.76 2622
Post-2 5.94 1.68 989
United Kingdom Pre 5.46 1.60 1884
Post-1 5.58 1.63 2936
Post-2 5.51 1.71 2334
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Table 8: Per country, Levene’s tests, Welch’s one-way ANOVAs and Games-Howell post-hoc tests for the differences in social
trust between the ESS measurement moments
Country Levene’s test One-way ANOVA Pre-Post 1 Pre-Post 2 Post 1-Post 2
Belgium F(2, 5469) = 6.76
p = .001
F(2, 3645.66) = 6.25
p = .002
P = .823 p = .003 p = .016
Czech Republic F(2, 7414) = 14.00
p < .001
F(2, 4581.86) = 10.36 
p < .001
p < .001 p = .021 p = .173
Denmark F(2, 4686) = 3.79
p = .023
F(2, 112.88) = .71
p = .494
p = .909 p = .487 p = .974
Finland F(2, 5963) = .49
p = .615
F(2, 3850.00) = 2.04
p = .130
p = .135 p = .332 p = .873




p = .990 p = .961 p = .951
Hungary F(2, 4703) = 9.36
p < .001
F(2, 3133.98) = 17.10
p < .001
p = .003 p = .050 p < .001
Ireland F(2, 5852) = 19.45
p < .001
F(2, 1868.13) = 10.27
p < .001
p < .001 p = .131 p = .005
Norway F(2, 4716) = 2.61
p = .073
F(2, 3133.82) = 2.35
p = .096
p = .138 p = .145 p = .996
Spain F(2, 5251) = 35.80
p < .001
F(2, 3399.83) = 8.66
p < .001
p < .001 p = .006 p = .608
Sweden F(2, 5168) = 1.63
p = .196
F(2, 1534.57) = 5.78
p = .003
p = .932 p = .002 p = .178
Switzerland F(2, 5124) = 9.53
p < .001
F(2, 3329.16) = .69
p = .502
p = .501 p = .019 p < .001
The Netherlands F(2, 6130) = .46
p = .633
F(2, 2716.16) = 1.04
p = .353
p = .999 p = .386 p = .358
United Kingdom F(2, 7215) = 5.10
p = .006
F(2, 4472.18) = 2.86
p = .057
p = .048 p = .589 p = .376
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